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Preface 
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Abstract 
This paper seeks to identify trans-boundary innovative coordination practices and 
related modes of specialization and steering instruments in welfare administration 
reforms. We describe how the 2005 reform of the welfare administration in Norway 
started as a coupling process involving merger and partnership, but later, following the 
2008 reorganization, introduced re-centralization and re-specialization, which implied 
decoupling. The main research questions are how we can explain this change from 
coupling to de-coupling of administrative reform and policy delivery? What are the main 
actors and interests behind it? What are the changes in organizing principles 
experienced? Why was the administrative reform not sustainable and reorganization 
through decoupling seen as a better answer to the «wicked issues» of welfare services? 
To answer these questions we apply a transformative theoretical approach, which 
combines a structural-instrumental perspective, a cultural-institutional perspective and 
an environmental perspective. 
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Sammendrag 
Dette notatet tar sikte på å identifisere grenseoverskridende innovativ samordnings- 
praksis og tilknyttede spesialiseringsformer og styringsinstrumenter i velferdsstats-
reformer. Vi beskriver hvordan NAV reformen i 2005 startet som er koplingsprosess 
preget av sammenslåinger og partnerskap. Men gjennom reorganiseringen i 2008 ble 
respesialisering og resentralisering introdusert noe som medførte de-kopling. 
Hovedproblemstillingen er hvordan vi kan forklare denne endringen fra kopling til de-
kopling i NAV-reformen. Hvem er de sentrale aktørene og interessene bak disse 
prosessene? Hvilke endringer i organisasjonsprinsipper kan observeres, og hvorfor 
oppleves disse som bedre egnet til å håndtere vanskelige problemer knyttet til 
tjenesteproduksjonen i NAV. For å svare på disse problemene benyttes en transformativ 
teoretisk tilnærming som kombinerer et strukturelt-instrumentelt perspektiv, et 
kulturelt-institusjonelt perspektiv og et omgivelsesperspektiv. 
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Introduction 
This paper has two main objectives. Firstly, it seeks to identify trans-boundary 
innovative coordination practices and related modes of specialization and steering 
instruments in welfare administration reforms. Secondly, it analyses the functioning of 
such coordination practices and looks at how they may be undermined, leading to a 
more fragmented public apparatus and overall to more hybridity (cf. Hunt 2005). 
Administrative systems have historically always been confronted with issues of 
integration, coordination and central capacity on the one hand and autonomy, 
fragmentation and disaggregation on the other. NPM has come to be associated with 
organizational rearrangements that enhance the capacity to handle tasks that can easily 
be located within separate, semi-autonomous organizations (Pollitt and Bockaert 2011). 
But it has also led to proliferation and fragmentation of the government apparatus and 
reduced the capacity to handle «wicked issues» that transcend organizational boundaries 
and administrative levels (Lægreid and Verhoest 2010). Post-NPM reform initiatives 
have addressed the challenge of integration in central government and the increasing 
demand for innovative collaborative arrangements that are able to handle cross-
boundary issues (cf. Christensen and Lægreid 2010).  
In 2001 Norway embarked on a major reform, inspired by post-NPM, of its central 
welfare administration – a long process initiated by Parliament (Christensen, Fimreite 
and Lægreid 2007). In 2005 it was decided to merge the central pensions and 
employment agencies and to create a partnership with locally based welfare services. 
During the period 2006-2009, local one-stop-shop welfare offices were gradually 
established in all municipalities. A reorganization in 2008 established regional pension 
units and administrative back offices in the counties that were allocated tasks and 
resources by local units (Christensen 2011).  
The reform was primarily an administrative or structural reform, and the main idea 
was to improve service delivery by reorganizing the administrative apparatus. In contrast 
to similar reforms in other countries (Christensen et al. 2009), no change in welfare 
policy was originally planned. This strategy was later revised, and a major pension 
reform was launched parallel to the implementation of the administrative reform.  
The original aim of the reform was to address a «wicked» policy issue, i.e. the fact 
that the apparatuses of the three welfare sub-sectors – pensions, employment and social 
services – were not well coordinated between sectors and levels, to the detriment of 
multi-service users (Christensen, Fimreite and Lægreid 2007). The proclaimed sub-goals 
of the reform were accordingly to make the new welfare administration more user-
friendly, to bring more people on welfare into the workforce and to become more 
efficient. This implied basically what we could label a coupling process between 
administrative reform and service delivery. Today, following implementation and 
reorganization of the reform, the original reform concept seems to have changed in the 
direction of decoupling administrative reform and changing the original focus on 
«wicked issue» of policy delivery. 
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As the reform proceeded, goals gradually changed, new policies were developed 
(pension reform) and the structural design changed substantially. The story is one of 
movement from coupling to de-coupling. This goes in the opposite direction to that 
usually identified by research on the dynamics between the two reform waves, where the 
solving of some ‘wicked issues’ creates new ones. It also shows the limitations of post-
NPM reform measures and reveals a trend towards hybridity. 
The main research questions of the paper are accordingly: 
How we can explain this change from coupling to de-coupling of administrative 
reform and policy delivery? What are the main actors and interests behind it? 
What are some of changes in organizing principles experienced? Why was the 
administrative reform not sustainable and reorganization through decoupling seen 
as a better answer to the ‘wicked issues’ of welfare services? 
This is more broadly speaking a question about the preconditions for sustaining the 
main ideas behind a reform in the implementation phase, related both to actors and to 
organizational thinking. We will use a transformative approach, taken from organization 
theory, to analyse the main research questions, which entails examining instrumental/ 
structural, cultural and environmental factors (Christensen and Lægreid 2001). The 
theory is primarily used to analyse the reform process. Explanations to be explored 
include environmental pressure (institutional and technical environments), domestic 
political administrative culture and tradition, policy features and structural characteristics 
of the political administrative system. The main data used are documents and elite 
interviews conducted during a major evaluation project related to the new welfare 
administration reform (cf. Christensen 2011). 
First, we give an overview of post-NPM reform measures linked to whole-of-
government initiatives to handle wicked cross-boundary problems. Then we present our 
transformative theoretical approach, which combines a structural-instrumental 
perspective, a cultural-institutional perspective and an environmental perspective. Third, 
we describe how the 2005 reform of the welfare administration in Norway started life as 
a coupling process involving merger and partnership, but later, following the 2008 
reorganization, introduced re-centralization and re-specialization, which implied 
decoupling. Fourth, we discuss how to understand the competing principles of 
organizing and decoupling and analyse the reorganization of the reform as a mixed 
order. Finally, we draw some conclusions and implications. 
Post-NPM reform measures and the handling of 
«wicked issues» 
It has increasingly been recognized that the specialization of the public sector apparatus 
furthered by NPM was not fit to tackle the big issues in society that the public sector 
was expected to handle (Christensen and Lægreid 2007). The functional line ministries 
and central agencies no longer corresponded with some of the most complex problems 
in society. There was a mismatch between the problem structures and the organizational 
structure, so that major tasks now cut across organizational boundaries. Examples of 
such ‘wicked problems’ (Rittle and Webber 1973) for which there are no clearly defined 
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or easily found solutions include unemployment, poverty and homelessness. None of 
these problems is likely to come under the purview of a single sectoral organization. 
Typically they involve more than one area of organizational competence and can 
therefore only be solved by working across organizational boundaries (Clark and 
Steward 2003). Wicked issues do not easily fit into a corresponding organizational 
context, so they challenge existing patterns of organization and management. The issues 
need to be framed and reframed. 
The concept of working across boundaries gained popularity in public administration 
and in management theory and practice from the late 1990s (Gregory 2003). The call for 
integrated services and for the public sector to work across boundaries indicates a 
problem of coordination in the public sector (Gregory 2003, Halligan 2007b). The new 
mantra was an increased focus on integration and joining the dots. NPM-style reforms 
are regarded as having led to fragmentation in the public sector and strained political 
and administrative leaders’ capacity to solve societal problems (Christensen and Lægreid 
2001, 2007). As a result of this fragmentation, the public sector finds it difficult to 
design and implement policies that will improve cohesion. It has therefore started to 
look beyond NPM and to develop new approaches to reform intended to counter this 
fragmentation and to re-coordinate the public sector (Osborne 2009, Wegrich 2010).  
The new coordination practices come in various shapes and have various names, 
such as whole-of-government (OECD 2005; Christensen and Lægreid 2007), integrated 
governance, outcome steering, joined-up governance (Baechler 2011, Bogdanor 2005; 
Hood 2005), holistic governance (Leat, Setzler and Stoke 2002), new public governance 
(Osborne 2009), networked government, partnerships, connected government, cross-
cutting policy, horizontal management or collaborative public management (Gregory 
2003). A common feature is the notion that working across organizational boundaries 
will enable more efficient and/or effective policy development, implementation and 
service delivery. Such modes of operating are supposed to counter ‘departmentalization’ 
and a «silo mentality». However, while they promise much, there are actually a number 
of challenges associated with using them in practice. Like NPM, post-NPM efforts aim 
to find «one size to fit all», which is rather unrealistic. 
Post-NPM has a vertical and a horizontal dimension and even tries to combine the 
two (Christensen and Lægreid 2007). Integrated governance in Australia and New 
Zealand has involved rebalancing centre and line ministries, a focus on outcome 
performance and improved service delivery, a rationalization of public bodies and a 
commitment to whole-of-government and integrated agendas at agency as well as 
service delivery level (Halligan 2010). One example of a country that adopted vertical 
post-NPM reform measures is the UK. The Blair government implemented rather 
aggressive top-down style whole-of-government initiatives (Stoker 2005), which 
strengthened the role of central government and established structures such as strategic 
units, reviews, and public service agreements. Both the UK and New Zealand have a 
clear hierarchical component in their style of «joining-up» (Perry 6 2005). Labour 
governments have tried over the past decade to improve service delivery by enhancing 
central control mechanisms while at the same time continuing to argue for more 
autonomy for the officials charged with delivering services, which shows hybrid features 
(Richards and Smith 2006). 
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The hierarchical strengthening of the centre has also led to a stronger prime 
minister’s office, in both a political and an administrative sense, as seen in the UK, 
Australia and New Zealand. It also implies stronger audit systems, tightening up 
financial management and strengthening governance and accountability regimes, as in 
Canada (Aucoin 2006). Measures like this are primarily concerned with strengthening 
central political capacity, potentially making subordinate agencies and companies less 
autonomous. Even though the Prime Minister’s Office in Australia has been 
strengthened (Halligan and Adams 2004: 86) and the specialized agencies brought back 
under greater central control (Halligan 2006), this represents more a tightening-up than 
major restructuring. 
The horizontal dimension, seen as even more important than the vertical, typically 
concerns policy areas that cut across traditional boundaries. The functional line 
encompasses ministries or central agencies no longer aligned with many of the most 
complex problems facing society. As a result, the governments have had to change their 
organizational design or learn to work together in a more comprehensive manner 
(Baechler 2011). In Australia and New Zealand, for example, new organizational units, 
such as new cabinet committees, inter-ministerial or inter-agency collaborative units, 
inter-governmental councils, the lead agency approach, circuit-breaker teams, super 
networks, task forces, cross-sectoral programs or projects, tsars, etc. have been 
established with the main purpose of getting government units to work better together 
(Gregory 2006, Halligan and Adams 2004). 
How this dimension is handled ranges from mergers to softer collaborative 
measures. Beginning in the mid-1990s, the Canadian government launched what were 
labelled horizontal management initiatives to tackle policy issues such as innovation, 
poverty, and climate change (Bakvis and Juliett 2004). Other examples of these were 
seen in Australia in 2002, where attempts were made to bring more coordination to such 
areas as national security, demographics, science, education, environmental 
sustainability, energy, rural and regional development, transportation, and work and 
family life (Halligan and Adams 2004). In 2003, a new Cabinet Implementation Unit was 
established in Australia to support whole-of-government activities. Creating 
coordinative structures inside existing central structures, increasing the strategic 
leadership role of the Cabinet, and focusing more on following up central decisions are 
typical hierarchical efforts in Australia. Their aim is to put pressure on the sectoral 
authorities to collaborate and coordinate better (Halligan 2006). In Norway a new 
minister of coordination was established in the Prime Minister’s Office in 2009. Other 
examples are merging agencies to form larger bodies, such as the Department of 
Homeland Security in the USA, the Ministry of Social Development in New Zealand, 
the Department of Human Services in Australia (including Centrelink) (Halligan 2007a) 
and the new welfare administration in Norway analysed in this paper.  
Post-NPM seems generally also to be more about working together in a pragmatic 
and intelligent way than about formalized collaboration. The approach to major stake-
holders in the environment, including private actors, is more heterogeneous and 
involves joined-up governance efforts and the use of networks and partnerships. 
Collaborative efforts aimed at delivering a seamless service, like Australia’s one-stop 
shops and Canada’s horizontal management (Bakvis and Juliett 2004), can be seen as 
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control from above to secure coordinated and efficient service delivery, but also as a real 
local collaborative effort requiring autonomy from central control (Halligan 2006). A 
comparative study of service delivery organizations in the UK, New Zealand, Australia, 
and the Netherlands concludes that procedural bureaucratic models are being 
superseded by network governance (Considine and Lewis 2003). 
The post-NPM reforms are also culturally oriented governance efforts. They focus 
on cultivating a strong and unified sense of values, teambuilding, the involvement of 
participating organizations, trust, value-based management, collaboration and improving 
the training and self-development of public servants (Ling 2002). The argument is that 
there is a need to re-establish a «common ethic» and a «cohesive culture» in the public 
sector because of the reported corrosion of loyalty and increasing mistrust brought 
about by NPM, which was rooted in diverse economic theories (Norman 1995). All 
agencies should be bound together by a single, distinctive public service ethos, as 
emphasized in Australia (Shergold 2004). Under the slogan «working together», the 
Australian government emphasized the need to build a supportive public-sector culture 
that encouraged whole-of-government solutions by formulating value guidelines and 
codes of conduct. The formalization of ethical rules for the central civil service in 
Norway in 2005 is another example (Christensen and Lægreid 2011b). 
Just as post-NPM was mostly a reaction to NPM, so post-NPM may raise some 
concerns that lead to more specialized elements being reintroduced in reforms, as 
illustrated in our case. First, the structural and cultural complexity implied by post-NPM 
may lead to further hybridity (Christensen and Lægreid 2011d). This, in turn, may 
produce more flexibility and legitimacy, but also more conflicts, ambiguity and chaos. 
Second, post-NPM challenges the capacity of political and administrative leaders, which 
begs the question of whether everything has to be coordinated or integrated, or whether 
some levels, sectors, policies or issues can manage without. As «wicked issues» reach 
across levels, sectors and policies, capacity problems may increase. Third, and highly 
relevant in our case, coordination challenges the capacity of single civil servants 
concerning the breadth and depth of their professional expertise. On the one hand, 
deep expertise may potentially prevent coordination and integration, while being a 
generalist may be insufficient in the face of increasing complexity and coordination. 
When two reform waves or sets of ideas confront one another, like NPM and post-
NPM, there may be different general mechanisms at work. According to a replacement 
hypothesis there will be pendulum swings. Post-NPM represents a new era of 
administrative reforms replacing the former reforms of NPM. NPM is allegedly dead 
(Dunleavy et al. 2006) and we are facing a paradigmatic shift towards a new reform 
movement underlining networks, partnerships, increased integration, coordination and 
central capacity. There is an integration process going on coupling different welfare state 
tasks and services into new cross-border organisational arrangements.  
Generally, we are sceptical towards such an explanation and it certainly does not fit 
our case, where NPM elements have modified post-NPM ones. An alternative 
hypothesis that comes closer to our view is the idea of layering, whereby reforms 
supplement or complement one another (Christensen and Lægreid 2010, Streeck and 
Thelen 2005). New reforms are added to old reforms in a layering process, making the 
reform landscape more hybrid and complex. Rather than replacement we see 
WELFARE  REFORM AND «WICKED» ISSUES WORKING PAPER  2  -  2012  
 11 
rebalancing, adjustments, continuities and mixtures of old and new reform features. 
Mergers and partnerships are installed, but NPM features are not rejected, and 
traditional bureaucratic forms of specialization and coordination are reintroduced in 
new versions. We may face coupling, followed by decoupling, and the reintroduction of 
traditional bureaucratic forms of specialization partly inspired by NPM. 
Theoretical approach 
The theoretical departure for this paper is a transformative approach (Christensen and 
Lægreid 2001 and 2007, Christensen et al. 2007), which points to structural, cultural and 
environmental factors to explain the processes and effects of public reforms, i.e. in our 
case coupling and decoupling through reform and reorganization. The first component 
of this approach is a structural-instrumental perspective based on the concept of bounded 
rationality (March and Simon 1958). This perspective implies that decision-makers in 
reform processes have limited time and attention and cannot address all goals, all 
alternatives or all consequences. They face problems of capacity and understanding and 
have to select decision-making premises and decide where to focus their attention and 
resources. Formal structures and procedures organize some actors, cleavages, problems 
and solutions into reform processes, in this case the welfare administrative reform, while 
others are excluded (cf. Schattschneider 1960). Thus, organization is politics by other 
means, and structures are important because they influence outcomes (Meier 2010). 
Therefore the formal organizational structure of public organizations represents an 
important selection mechanism that constrains as well as enabling the service delivery 
process. Their quality depends on their success in balancing unity, integration and 
system coordination on the one hand and diversity, flexibility and local (government) 
autonomy on the other (Olsen 2004). 
Based on this perspective we would expect the reorganization of the welfare 
administrative reform in Norway to be dominated and hierarchically controlled by top 
political and administrative executive leaders or characterized by a negotiation process 
between them. The motivation for the reorganization is expected to be that the main 
goals of the reforms – i.e., getting more people on welfare into the workforce and 
creating a more service-oriented apparatus that works more efficiently – is supposedly 
more easily fulfilled by decoupling than coupling the services involved.  
A cultural-institutional perspective is based on the notion that public organizations 
gradually develop unique cultural features as a result of an adaptation to internal and 
external pressure through natural processes (Scott and Davis 2006, Selznick 1957). The 
focus is more on informal norms and values than formal ones. The development of a 
public institution is characterized by path-dependency, meaning that the context and 
norms and values that prevailed when the institution was established will determine the 
path taken later on, i.e. «roots determine routes» (Pierson 2004). When a reform comes 
along, cultural traditions will be confronted with new norms and values, and the fate of 
the reform may depend on the compatibility between reform and tradition (Painter and 
Peters 2009, Verhoest 2011). This implies that if cultural compatibility is high, a reform 
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will easily be implemented, while if it is low, the reform will be rejected or implemented 
only partially and pragmatically (Brunsson and Olsen 1997). 
This perspective may see the development from coupling to decoupling as derived 
from the professional norms and values prevailing in public organizations. When a 
reform brings about integration, coordination or mergers, this often means that the 
professional cultures of different organizations or units confront one another, so that 
the success of the reform depends on whether these different professional cultures can 
be integrated. This also applies to the reform of the welfare administration in Norway. 
The merger of the pension service, which had a Weberian culture, and the employment 
service, which had evolved a more modern culture having been exposed to competition 
from private actors, brought two rather different cultures together. The merger also 
extended to local partnerships with the social services in the municipalities, thus 
involving yet another professional culture and presenting a further integration challenge. 
A crucial question to be analysed here, then, is whether the reorganization of the reform 
brought about by decoupling was the result of three professional cultures each trying to 
keep to their cultural paths and thus obstructing or modifying the reform. 
Third, an environmental perspective divides the environment into two parts, the technical 
and the institutional environment (Meyer and Rowan 1977). The technical environment 
influences the instrumental or internal structural elements of public organizations via 
resources or services delivered or received. Demands from the technical environment 
may change the internal structure as part of a reform, for example in times of crisis or 
strong pressure, as was the case when economic problems prompted New Zealand to 
introduce NPM-related reforms in the early 1980s (Aberbach and Christensen 2001). 
The institutional environment deals with taken-for-grantedness and myths in the 
environment and processes of isomorphism. International organizations, multinational 
consulting firms, important single countries or dominant national organizations may 
further certain reforms such as organizational solutions/models for public organizations 
(Sahlin-Andersson 2001). These are adopted to further legitimacy in public 
organizations by giving them a more modern image. In this case, political leaders use 
reform symbols as window-dressing (Brunsson 1989). 
Using such a perspective one can first ask whether there are events or crises in the 
environment that lead reforms from coupling to decoupling. Second, we can ask 
whether certain symbols are evoked that lead to this decoupling? 
We now turn to the Norwegian reform of the welfare administration, which is an 
example of how hybrid organizational solutions were launched that represent an 
unstable balance between competing principles and considerations inspired by both 
post-NPM reform ideas and NPM features. 
The 2005 reform – coupling through merger and 
partnership 
One of the major challenges for the Norwegian welfare services as they existed before 
2001 was institutional fragmentation, i.e. they were located in different ministries and 
agencies and at different administrative levels. This created obstacles for clients with 
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complex problems, in particular the so-called multi-service clients (Christensen, Fimreite 
and Lægreid 2007). In 2001 a big majority in the Storting asked the government to start 
a process that would eventually lead to the merging and coordination of three services – 
the central government-based pension’s service and employment service, and the social 
services based in local government. This became a rather ambiguous and symbol-
oriented initiative – labelled «one welfare administration» – because it was politically 
unthinkable for either the central or the local level to take over all the services 
(Christensen, Fimreite and Lægreid 2007). 
The conservative-centre minority government’s report to the parliament basically 
argued that the existing fragmented structure was the best one. The Storting sent the 
report back, saying that the government had not responded in an appropriate way to the 
wish for a unified service. The government then established a public committee 
consisting of academic experts on welfare policy and administration (Christensen, 
Fimreite and Lægreid 2007). The committee supported the government in its resistance 
to any merger or major collaboration between the services. The incoming minister in 
2004, now the head of a labour and social ministry embracing all three services, then 
proposed a compromise that was accepted by an overall majority in 2005. The main 
goals of the new welfare administration were to get more people off welfare and into 
work and to be more efficient and user-friendly. 
The new welfare administration reform had two major elements. First, it merged the 
pensions and employment agencies, from top to bottom, into a new welfare agency 
(Askim et al. 2009). In terms of its relationship to the ministry this was established as a 
rather traditional agency, meaning a combination of independence and unambiguous 
political control, which reflected the political salience of the policy area. Merging the 
two former agencies into a new central welfare agency, with units at the regional and 
local level, increased both structural and cultural complexity, i.e. units and employees 
had to be merged and moved around in a complex process, and professional milieus 
with different norms and values were pressured to collaborate and develop a new, more 
holistic culture. The new agency was also rather complex in its internal structure, with 
several central staff units and a major organizational division between the ordinary line 
organization on all levels and a «specialist units division» encompassing both country-
wide support functions and the pension’s policy area (Askim et al. 2009). It also 
included an internal purchaser-provider model within the central agency, which was later 
modified (Simlenes 2011). 
Second, a mandatory «one-stop shop» was established as a physically co-located local 
partnership between the three services, which produced the rather unusual combination 
of a central and local hierarchy. A central agreement was reached between the national 
organization for municipalities and the ministry, followed by local agreements that had 
both mandatory (co-location, financial social assistance as a minimum service from local 
government, one office in each municipality) and discretionary elements (joint or dual 
management structure, adding extra local sub-services) (Fimreite and Lægreid 2009). 
The idea was also to change the employees’ role behaviour in the one-stop shops from 
specialists to generalists, so they became «modified generalists».  
Most of the local partnerships applied a unified management model and added 
several local services to the one-stop shops (Aars and Christensen 2011). The local 
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offices that changed the least were those in the large cities where the common model 
was a divided leadership, whereby former service units were retained inside the new 
local offices, potentially making it more difficult to develop a real unified service. On 
the one hand, the central government, through the new agency, could easily benefit 
from and dominate such a partnership, because it seemed to be asymmetrical. But the 
organizational model was a compromise, where the new central agency’s wish to use the 
principle of a local unitary management model and a standardized task portfolio did not 
prevail. On the other hand, the local welfare offices gave the municipalities an 
opportunity to receive resources to solve tasks related to social services, and they also 
used this opportunity to include many other local services in the offices. 
When the new organization was established, the unions managed to get an agreement 
that no employee would lose their job, making it more difficult to fulfil the goal of more 
efficiency and aggravating the complexity of the organization (Askim et al. 2010). It was 
also argued strongly that there should be one welfare office in every municipality, which, 
given the number of services and sub-services, presented a challenge for local 
competence. Politically, however, this was understandable given the political concern to 
strengthen the legitimacy of the reform in the municipalities. The regional level in the 
new welfare organization thus lost out both to the central and to the local level, but this 
was later to change. 
The 2008 reorganization of the reform: decoupling 
through hierarchy and specialization by tasks. 
The reorganization of the reform in 2008 had two central components (Christensen 
2011, Christensen and Lægreid 2011a). First, it established six regional pension units and 
other special units for complaints, foreign affairs, control and physical aid, which meant 
moving employees from the local offices up to the regional level and implied a vertical 
de-specialization or integrative movement. The units were not put in the main line 
organization, but were subordinated to a central agency department for special units, 
entailing a kind of horizontal differentiation. This reorganization to a large extent 
removed pension services from the local level and coincided with a large pension 
reform and the introduction of a new ICT system for pensions (Førde 2011).  
Second, at least one administrative welfare unit was established at the regional level 
in each of Norway’s nineteen counties to handle rights-based services and benefits. 
Altogether there are now 37 regional administrative welfare units. They were placed in 
the main line organization, under the leadership of the NAV county director, i.e. they 
represent, like the pension units on the regional level, a change in the direction of 
vertical de-specialization, but not a corresponding horizontal change. The 
reorganization also moved more local employees in the NAV administration up to the 
regional level. Altogether this movement towards back-offices implied a clear weakening 
of resources in the local NAV offices and a strengthening of the regional level which is 
closely supervised by the central level of the agency. 
The more general principles of casework also changed with the reorganization. The 
original idea of the welfare reform was to have local offices that could handle all kinds 
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of questions, i.e. a broad general ideal, something that was pretty ambitious given the 
fact that the NAV has 50-60 sub-policy areas or sub-services. The reorganization in 
2008 formally left this principle intact but indirectly undermined it by simultaneously 
subscribing to the principle of economies of scale and the importance of having 
specialists on the regional level handling most questions, as a way of promoting 
efficiency, professional quality and the equal treatment of cases (Christensen 2011). 
Since moving a lot of employees up to the regional level left the local offices more 
vulnerable concerning resources, even though they had also lost a lot of tasks, it became 
more common to urge the local offices to collaborate or offer specialized assistance on 
certain task portfolios within a county. Internally, in each office, it also became more 
common to let employees specialize in three or four sub-services, meaning a 
combination of generalist and specialist task-handling. Altogether this represented a 
move away from the ambition of establishing a new generalist role and towards re-
specialization (Helgøy, Kildal and Nilssen 2011). 
While the goal of the original reform was to have local units handle most of the case-
work in the welfare administration, the 2008 reorganization was based on a principle of 
level differentiation in the decision-making process involving five phases or sub-
processes. The local offices were to be given the task of informing clients about the 
various welfare policies and opportunities for support and services, and of receiving all 
the different types of applications. However, the actual handling of the cases was now 
mostly entrusted to the new regional/county units. Once decisions had been taken 
about payments, these were to be made by the regional and national level, while it was 
the local offices’ job to support clients, in getting work, for example. So the local offices 
were assigned tasks 1 (informing), 2 (receiving applications) and 5 (follow-up) in the 
decision-making and handling chain, while the regional and/or central level were given 
tasks 3 (deciding) and 4 (paying) (Christensen and Lægreid 2011c). 
The reorganization also changed the system for how clients approached the welfare 
administration. The original reform was based on a ‘one-door’ principle, meaning that 
clients, particularly multi-service users, only had to come to one physical location. In the 
reorganization of 2008 there was more talk of a modern «three channel-strategy», 
meaning that the number of clients who had to actually show up at the local welfare 
office was reduced and instead services were also provided via the internet or by 
telephone, with the latter entailing the establishment of large regional call centres. 
After the reorganization of the reform in 2008 there was a lot of public and political 
debate about the NAV reform, including several periods of crisis and a public hearing in 
the Storting (Parliament) based on a very critical report by the General Auditor’s Office. 
There are many reasons for this. One is that it is generally difficult to make such a huge 
organization adapt to a complex and hybrid reform. Another is that part of the coalition 
behind the reform subsequently turned against it in some respects. Our elite 
respondents report that their experience of the opposition in the Storting became more 
negative, with employees’ unions and client organizations also adopting an increasingly 
critical stance. This generally critical attitude was seized on by the media, which found a 
lot of sad individual cases (not a difficult task in a public service of this kind) to illustrate 
the problems of the reorganization. The General Auditor’s Office was also eager to 
show that the reform had been a failure. All this is in rather stark contrast to the main 
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sentiments of the elite respondents we interviewed who spoke rather favourably of the 
effects of the reform and the urgency of the 2008 reorganization. 
As a result of all the criticism and crises, the Ministry of Labour in 2010 established 
an expert group to analyse the organization of and activities in the local welfare offices 
and the county administrative units, and in particular their interaction and division of 
tasks – in other words to look primarily at one central part of the reorganization of the 
reform (Christensen 2011). The group’s assessment was rather critical, pointing to 
problems of productivity and quality in service provision, but also to increases in the 
number of clients, particular those seeking assistance from the employment service, and 
to the huge problems of implementation and adaptation of the new structure. Even 
though the group was critical, like our elite respondents, it mainly supported the 
reorganization of the reform in 2008 and also thought that the welfare agency had been 
able to counteract some of its negative effects with compensatory measures.  
Discussion: competing principles of organizing and 
decoupling 
Generally, increased coordination may result in an increased need for specialization, but 
which specialization principle is selected will be of considerable significance for the 
choice of coordinating mechanisms. The first question is, therefore, whether the same 
specialization principle shall apply at both the central and local levels or whether these 
principles can be at variance. The next question concerns the implications this may have 
for multi-level coordination as well as internal coordination at the different levels 
(Fimreite and Lægreid 2005). For example, if the central level is organized by sector and 
the local level by clients (or process or area), will this imply weak vertical coordination 
between the central and local levels while horizontal coordination within local 
government is well-established? Will the result of this be increased autonomy and 
holistic thinking locally? And will this, in turn, present a challenge to integration 
between the two levels of government, resulting in the need for new coordination 
measures designed to counteract the consequences of autonomy? 
Askim et al. (2011) distinguish between the following dimensions with respect to the 
one-stop shops or local welfare offices: a) whether the task portfolio is narrow or broad, 
shallow or deep (partial or complete product closure); b) whether the participant 
structure is simple or complex; c) whether autonomy is low or high; d) whether the 
proximity to citizens is distant or close; and e) whether the instruments are integrated or 
not. The Norwegian welfare partnership arrangements were originally characterized by a 
broad, but shallow task portfolio, a complex participant structure, a low level of 
autonomy, close proximity to citizens, and high degree of integration in the instruments 
used.  
After the reorganization of the reform in 2008 the task portfolio of the one-stop 
shops became narrower and also shallower. Fewer policy areas and tasks were addressed 
locally and only some phases in the decision-making process were left to the one-stop 
shops: informing, receiving applications and follow-ups, but not deciding or paying. The 
participant structure was made even more complicated by the addition of regional 
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administrative layers with administrative units and pension units. The local autonomy 
was not altered. It remained limited, with little leeway or discretion for the one-stop 
shops regarding the organizational arrangements. The establishment of regional units 
made proximity to citizens more distant, as did supplementing direct contact with call 
centres and internet solutions. The local-regional divide made the instruments 
somewhat less integrated. 
In the second phase of the reform, however, there was a partial organizational 
reversion and decoupling of tasks. This was brought about by a weakening of 
integration in partnership arrangements and a transfer of tasks and responsibilities to 
organizations at the regional level specialized according to task and purpose. While the 
reform process started as a purely administrative reform decoupled from policy changes, 
which were indeed minor, the second phase was to a greater extent informed by the 
upcoming big policy reform - a new pensions system. This triggered a coupling between 
the administrative reform and the policy reform. The new pensions system needed an 
administrative apparatus that was more specialized according to task (pensions) and less 
holistic, integrated and cross-boundary. Some welfare services (especially pensions) have 
a stronger focus on national standardization and equal treatment across geographical 
areas, while others (such as social security and labour) are more open to local variations 
and discretion (Fimreite 2011). Thus the first type of task favours specialization 
according to task while the second favours specialization according to area. 
So the answer to the problems the reform produced was to establish specialized 
administrative units on the county level, which undermined the basic geographical 
principle of the reform and established a complex structure that combined a slim-
downed front-office with specialized back offices. This was thought to increase 
efficiency through economies of scale or synergy effects, raise the professional quality of 
the decisions by increasing the critical mass of experts working together, and make 
treatment more standardized in 30 to 40 county back offices than in local offices in 430 
municipalities, in which practices had previously varied. The rather unusual arrangement 
of specializing the processing of cases by spreading it over two levels was also seen as 
relieving pressure on the local level, which was then left to specialize in informing, 
receive applications and following up, instead of having to deal with a broad-spectrum 
task portfolio. The workload of the local level was also reduced by moving from a «one-
door» to a «three channel» solution, showing the relevance of an environmental 
perspective. Technically it was no longer necessary for all clients to show up at local 
offices in person. Instead, they could choose the mode of communication best suited to 
their problems and abilities, and institutionally this was supported by a new set of 
symbols casting this differentiation as «modern». 
Thus, the reform dynamic can be understood as a learning process. The trajectory of 
the NAV reform followed a sort of stimulus-response pattern regarding specialization 
and coordination (Bouckaert, Peters and Verhoest 2010). The reform itself had a clearly 
holistic, integrating ambition focusing on coordination issues. But in the reorganization 
of the reform in 2008 the organizational model was somewhat rebalanced towards re-
specialization. This implied increased internal horizontal specialization between 
pensions and employment/social services and between different phases in the decision-
making and service-providing process, which taken together represented a geographical 
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centralizing integration process strengthening the regional level vis-à-vis the local one. 
This represents a mixed order of different organizational principles (Olsen 2010). Rather 
than purifying one single organizational principle in a stable organizational model, we 
face a system in a state of flux that blends different types of specialization and 
coordination over time. All types of specialization have advantages and disadvantages 
and if one principle becomes too dominant it may trigger a counter-reaction whereby 
the opposite principle is reactivated and the mixture of complementary principles 
rebalanced.  
Another interpretation of the reform process is to look at it as a two-phase model of 
reform implying a sequencing path, whereby the local one-stop shops should be 
completed before embarking on developing regional units. Capacity problems, reform 
complexity and goal conflicts imply a sequential attention to goals (Cyert and March 
1963). First, the merger and the establishment of local welfare offices had to be 
implemented, then this model had to be recalibrated, because the whole new 
organization lacked the capacity to do everything at the same time. 
Analysing the reorganization of the reform: a 
mixed order 
Why were some of the central principles of such a huge administrative reform 
reorganized again after only a few years? In the first phase of the reform process in the 
Norwegian welfare administration, parliamentary politicians were the main reform 
agents, having a greater say than either the executive politicians, the experts or the 
central bureaucracy in the choice of organizational model (Christensen, Fimreite and 
Lægreid 2007). In the second phase of the reform the actor constellation was the other 
way around, proving Patashnik’s (2008) assertion that it is important to understand the 
regrouping of the actors’ field in the implementation phase.  
If we look at the control aspects and influence patterns of the welfare administrative 
reform, the whole basis for the reform was a request from the Storting to create a single 
service and strong local offices, while the compromise proposed by the minister in order 
to get all the actors on board was the ‘bait’ of a local partnership. At the time when the 
reform was decided on it was important politically to have some kind of merger of 
services combined with an incentive for the municipalities and social services to go 
along with it. However, the reform was mainly decided against the will of the 
administrative leadership in the ministry and the former employment administration; 
hence the post-reform repositioning.  
The reorganizations of 2008 brought back elements from the pre-2005 process in the 
sense that the pension services became more of ‘an organization within an organization’, 
in accordance with the original wishes of conservative ministers, the administrative elite 
and the expert committee, which had proposed letting only the employment service and 
social services collaborate more locally instead of merging. After the reorganization of 
2008 this became the core local element. The parliamentary politicians were now less 
active participants, the executive politicians became more active and the reorganization 
of the reform was mainly seen as an internal managerial process where the agency 
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leadership dominated, i.e. the main reform process and the reorganization process had 
different actor structures and therefore different results. In both phases, however, the 
process typically scored rather low on clear organizational thinking, which instead was 
changing, ambiguous and not well founded, despite the inclusion of experts. Actors 
shared common goals but proposed widely differing routes for arriving at them. This 
seems to be typical of reform processes in many countries, because the societal and 
public structures, cultures and interests that must be catered to are becoming more 
complex (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011).  
So why did the solution originally leading to the reform – which constituted a 
response to the «wicked issue» of fragmentation – eventually lead to more fragmentation 
and decoupling again in the reorganization of 2008? Our take on this involves a 
combination of instrumental, cultural and environmental features. One instrumentally 
oriented answer to this is that the leaders of the welfare agency thought that the new 
reform structure was not working well and that it created all sorts of problems, i.e. 
solving one «wicked issue» produced several others. The reform was too broad, showing 
the weakness of using post-NPM principles too extensively. There was an increasing 
recognition that specialization by purpose had many advantages and that silos existed 
for good reasons (Page 2005). The pension services did not overlap much with 
employment and social issues, because they had a lot of one-service users, i.e. retired 
people, and the pension reform, and the reorganization that followed, gave the leaders 
an opportunity to «purify» this service more and to improve it through a new ICT 
system (Førde 2011). This «flight» of one of the services made it easier to focus on the 
core of the reform – the collaboration between employment and social services whose 
aim was to get more people into the workforce and to handle multi-service clients 
better. 
The 2005 reform was the result of a compromise where the central political and 
administrative leaders partly lost out to the Parliament. Now in the implementation 
phase, which was more internal, it was time for these actors to strike back and use 
hierarchical influence to create an organizational model that was closer to their wishes. 
The core actor in this reorganization was the top leadership of the new agency. Added 
to this, following the reorganization of 2008, the employment services, which originally 
had opposed the reform, managed to retain a more central position in the central NAV 
agency than the pensions service. They thus ended up with an organization, including 
regional units, that looked more like their old employment organization, in other words 
the structural reforms exhibited path-dependency, i.e. a cultural-institutional explanation 
(cf. Krasner 1988). 
For most of the elite respondents we interviewed on the central level it was rather 
self-evident that establishing the regional/county units for the pensions and 
administrative services would support the local level and make it better. Even though it 
may sound somewhat paradoxical and controversial, particularly seen from the local 
level, to say that moving resources and tasks away from the local level and up to the 
regional level was a win-win situation for both levels, the arguments were, as already 
noted, that larger units on the regional level all represented improvements in efficiency, 
quality of competence and equal treatment of cases. Again this is an instrumental 
argument that could be defended based on the expected effects of the new regional 
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units, but is less easy to accept as an overall good solution for the organization, 
particularly at the local level. 
One reason for the reorganization of 2008 was that a huge pension reform was 
eminent that would anyhow result in some kind of reorganization of the pensions 
administration. Whether that would also have led to the reorganization of the other two 
services is may be more debatable, but that was the respondents’ argument. The chances 
of the reorganization of the pensions administration succeeding were greatly improved 
by major investment in a new ICT system, while the other two services and their new 
administrative units on the county level still had to struggle to cope with four or five 
different old ICT systems for their services, even though they too were in the process of 
digitalizing and scanning documents. So there were good instrumental reasons to 
reorganize for improvement. 
But why not strengthen the remaining tasks in the local welfare offices instead of 
moving resources up to the regional administrative units? The answer to this question 
requires a combination of instrumental and cultural explanations. The main instrumental 
answer is that in many municipalities, in particular the medium-sized and small ones, the 
resources were not sufficient to handle such a complex task portfolio. This created 
concerns about equal treatment in different geographical locations and efficiency 
concerns. A more cultural answer would be that the complex task portfolio demanded a 
higher level of competence from the employees; in addition the new mix of people 
brought about by the reorganization meant that some people lost the tasks they had 
previously performed and had to learn new ones. 
An additional explanation for why a reorganization took place that reintroduced 
elements of the original arrangements is that it was in a sense natural to develop the new 
welfare organization further after 2005. This is a typical cultural argument. Seen from a 
capacity point of view it was difficult to cope with more than merging two national 
services, establishing a local partnership and gradually establishing all the new local 
welfare offices. The public documents that prepared the way for the decision on the 
reform in 2005 mentioned that some of the services needed to develop further and to 
establish larger units for handling cases, i.e. a gradual development was better than 
making all the changes at the same time. 
Also the pressure from the environment changed and was less important during the 
implementation process, and the symbols used changed as well. The Parliament played 
an important role in deciding to go ahead with the reform in the first place, but was 
understandably a much weaker actor in the implementation phase, which was more 
internally based. The media also paid less attention to the problems of the reform for 
some years and only became more critical once the reorganization had taken place and 
produced problems of a general nature. The organizations of users and civil servants 
were also rather weak in the implementation phase. All this made it possible for the 
leadership of the agency to switch from the «one door» symbol to the «three channels» 
one, only one of which involved clients meeting staff face-to-face at the local offices. 
This also implied changing organizational principles, because the regional level was 
expected to cope with the other channels, i.e. the internet contact and the call centres 
connected to «back offices». 
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We may characterize this development as a complex, mixed and unstable order 
(Olsen 2010) that in different ways balances elements from the old public 
administration, NPM reforms and post-NPM reforms (Christensen and Lægreid 2011d). 
Rather than pendulum shifts we observe layering and sedimentation (Streeck and Thelen 
2005). The «messy» patterns that emerge constitute a continuation of understanding 
combined with ad hoc and politically driven adjustments, leading to diversification 
(Lodge and Gill 2011). Multi-dimensional orders that may be hybrid are considered to 
be more resilient to external shocks and therefore preferable to uni-dimensional orders 
(March and Olsen 1989). The emerging complexity reflects the central elements of a 
transformative approach: the hierarchical efforts of controlling the reform processes, 
influenced and partly modified by the elements of negotiations and heterogeneity, the 
complexity of cultural elements and historical-institutional legacy, the pressure from 
changing technical environments and the competing reform myths from the 
institutional environment. The welfare administration case shows that the expected 
effects are problematic to fulfil for political and administrative leaders. The overall 
performance of the new system has not lived up to expectations, so even though central 
control has been achieved, the local partnerships and offices are struggling to deliver on 
the main reform goals.  
Conclusion 
In this paper we have revealed that uncovering the linkages between administrative 
reforms and public policy is more complex than it appears at first sight. Administrative 
reforms create new institutional structures, which will drive change in public policy, but 
not necessarily in the direction expected by the reform agents. New policy initiatives, 
such as the pensions reform, also affect the administrative reforms and change the 
structural arrangements. So there is obviously a co-evolution between administrative 
structure and public policy, and the relationship between them might be better 
understood as mutually affected processes rather than clear cause-effect relations. 
Coordination and coordination mechanisms are challenged when principles of 
organizational specialization undergo change (Verhoerst and Bouckaert 2005). The 
principles of specialization are concerned with tasks and relationships which should be 
regarded in conjunction and coordinated, and which could be kept detached. And 
different specialization principles will enhance different networks, identities and conflict 
patterns. An organization specialized according to the geographical area served will 
encourage policy-makers to primarily pay attention to particular territorial concerns. 
Redesigning sectorally specialized organizations into geographically structured ones 
would thus tend to transform functional conflicts into territorial conflicts (Egeberg 
2001, 2004). This was a major concern of the reform in 2005 with its focus on the local 
level – a focus that shifted to the regional level in 2008. Sector specialization has a 
tendency to weaken relations that have developed territorially, for example in 
geographically based units such as municipalities, and to strengthen policy 
standardization across territorial units. When the administrative units were reorganized 
in 2008 there was some discussion about whether even larger regional units were more 
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feasible. However, the geographical-political interests of the county branch of the 
agency led to a decision against this. Thus, structures and specialization principles are 
value-laden and they institutionalize biases in favour of one set of clients or users over 
others (Meier 2010). 
The NAV reform is an administrative reform aimed also at strengthening the steering 
capacity of the welfare administration. A complex multi-level system including a mixed 
order of hierarchy and network has been set up. The network is represented by the 
partnership model between the central and local government, while the hierarchy 
obviously extends from the central government – i.e., the ministry, via the central 
agency to the regional units and below. The local network represents coordination 
through mutual adjustment rather than hierarchical steering (Bouckaert et al. 2010). An 
organizational model that implies use of these two forms at the same time is challenging.  
To make it even more complicated the organizational specialization in NAV has an 
inbuilt tension between specialization by geography, purpose, client and process. While 
territorial specialization tends to enhance local and municipal issues, specialization based 
on purpose tends to standardize across geographical entities and to see tasks in 
connection with one another within the sector. NAV encompasses both tasks that are 
independent of place – i.e., those based on national standardization and equality, like 
pension issues – and place-related tasks based on local geographical discretion and 
leeway, such as employment-related issues and in particular social services (Fimreite 
2011). The challenge is to combine specialization principles in such a way that both 
considerations are addressed. 
The NAV reform represents an unstable balance between territorial and sectoral 
specialization and between coordination by networks and by hierarchy. The partnership 
model was launched as a Columbian egg that should balance these considerations 
(Fimreite and Lægreid 2009). Our analysis reveals that this is a demanding and delicate 
balancing act. Specialization by process is higher on the agenda, and standard 
operational procedures in the bureaucracy represented by coordination by hierarchy and 
specialization by purpose seem to have gained the upper hand at the expense of 
coordination by networks and specialization by geography. The establishment of 
administrative units and pension units at the regional level subordinate to the central 
agency is a clear indication of this development.  
In 2008 the reform went into a second stage. Some of the organizational measures 
introduced in 2005 were modified or partly reversed. The bureaucracy bounced back 
and restored specialization by purpose but with a somewhat different flavour than 
before. Tasks and resources were moved from the local partnership agencies in the 
municipalities to governmental bodies at the regional level. In contrast to local 
government with political decentralization to politically elected bodies, the regional units 
were branches of the central agency and thus represented administrative decentralization 
or delegation. Thus now the main specialization principle was by purpose or task and 
not by geography. It was supposed to bring about standardization across regions and 
within the same tasks, but variation between different tasks. To some extent this last 
reorganization represents one step back towards the original organizational model, but 
the pendulum has by no means swung back to the starting point. It is, however, a 
paradox that integration and improved inter-organizational coordination as well as 
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increased coordination between central and local government, which was one of the 
main goals behind the NAV reform, is still a big challenge (Fimreite and Lægreid 2008). 
Our analysis of the Norwegian case reveals a reform process that has produced 
complex and unstable solutions that in different ways attend to a balance of different 
principles of specialization and coordination, and their combination. The complexity 
that emerges reflects the fact that hierarchical efforts to control the reform process are 
constrained by problems of rational calculation. The case also shows that expected 
effects are problematic to fulfil for political and administrative leaders. The overall 
performance of the new system has not lived up to expectations, so even though central 
control has been achieved, the local partnerships and offices are struggling to deliver on 
the main reform goals (Askim et al. 2010). There seems to be a stimulus-response 
pattern between specialization and coordination as well as between different types of 
specialization. We have revealed a reform process that started out as a coupling of the 
relationship between organizational structure and service delivery and that sought via 
merger and partnership to better handle «wicked issues» but that subsequently became a 
partial decoupling via re-centralization and re-specialization to address more specific 
service delivery tasks. 
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